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As the only region containing a land frontier with a European Union from which the UK has 
chosen to depart, Northern Ireland will be particularly significantly affected by withdrawal. 
It is the prospect of the return of a ‘hard border’ partitioning the island of Ireland, not seen 
since the Troubles, which is perhaps of greatest concern. However, the status of the border 
is only one of several issues vexing Northern Ireland. This report concentrates upon the four 
most important: the lack of consent for withdrawal; the impact upon the Good Friday 
Agreement; the hardening of the border; and prospects for cross-border trade. 
 
The lack of consent for withdrawal 
The withdrawal of Northern Ireland from the EU lacks local democratic legitimacy, in that 
the region voted by 56 per cent (440,707 votes) to 44 per cent (349,442) to remain. The 
Northern Ireland vote amounted to 0.2 per cent of the 17,410,742 total UK leave tally and 
0.3 per cent of the remain side’s support. Nationalist areas voted strongly to remain, Foyle 
providing the third highest percentage remain vote in the UK, the highest outside London. 
Majority Unionist areas were much more evenly divided, but mainly voted in favour of 
withdrawal. However, Fermanagh and South Tyrone, the constituency of the Arlene Foster, 
the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) First Minister of Northern Ireland, returned a  59 per 
cent remain vote on the highest turnout (67 per cent) in the region. Locally, the contest was 
marked by modest turnout; at 63 per cent, nine per cent lower than the UK figure. Public 
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opinion appeared largely unchanged in the year preceding the referendum, the 2015 
Northern Ireland General Election survey having indicated an 11 per cent lead for Remain 
twelve months earlier.1 
 
Withdrawal from the EU will eventually require the parliamentary repeal of the European 
Communities Act (1972) which allowed the UK to join the (then) European Economic 
Community and enshrined the supremacy of its law. This repeal will presumably arrive at 
the end of the Article 50 withdrawal process. Ultimately Westminster determines Northern 
Ireland’s membership of, or withdrawal from, the EU. A recent House of Lords European 
Union committee report stated in respect of Scottish exit, that ‘the Scottish Parliament’s 
consent would be required’ before the extinguishing of EU law, based upon a view offered 
by Sir David Edward, a former Judge of the Court of Justice of the European Union.2 The 
Committee extended this view to suggest that, given how the European Communities Act is 
entrenched in the devolution settlements in Northern Ireland and Wales, the committee 
‘has no reason to believe that the requirement for legislative consent for its repeal would 
not apply to all the devolved nations’.  
 
However, the withholding of consent for EU withdrawal by the Northern Ireland Assembly 
would be a purely symbolic gesture, given the Westminster sovereign over-ride. 
Westminster determines EU policy, including membership for Stormont. However futile 
resistance may be, consent for an EU exit will certainly not be forthcoming from the 
Northern Ireland Assembly, based upon party stances. It would be supported by only  
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approximately one-third of the 129 members; the 38 belonging to the DUP, the solitary 
Traditional Unionist Voice representative nd possibly a very small number from the Ulster 
Unionist Party’s 16-strong contingent (against leadership policy) whilst the left-wing People 
Before Profit’s two members might back withdrawal. All other parties are strongly opposed 
to exit.  Key decisions for Northern Ireland are taken in the Assembly on the basis of parallel 
cross-community consent, which clearly not pertain in this case given that the two 
nationalist parties of the SDLP and Sinn Fein strongly oppose withdrawal. However, this is a 
key decision beyond Stormont’s scope. 
 
The Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP) leader, Colum Eastwood, has urged that 
‘every parliamentary and diplomatic tool must now  be used to maintain the North’s 
membership of the EU … whether it is through the Danish model of selective territorial 
membership or via another creative exemption, every legal and logistical avenue must now 
be explored’.3 Although surely doomed to fail, legal challenges to withdrawal could 
conceivably delay the process. In contrast, the DUP position is that the UK government will 
negotiate on Northern Ireland’s behalf, with Arlene Foster dismissive of the tentative idea of 
the Irish government to establish a North-South forum to discuss implications of the UK exit.  
 
Implications for the Good Friday Agreement  
Northern Ireland opponents of EU withdrawal can use the Good Friday Agreement to 
bolster their case. The 1998 deal pledges close cooperation over its contents as ‘partners in 
the European Union’. It pledges the North-South Ministerial Council, established under 
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Strand Two of the deal, to ‘consider the European Union dimension of relevant matters, 
including the implementation of EU policies and programmes’.  The views of the Council 
must be ‘taken into account and represented appropriately at relevant EU meetings’. 
Withdrawal means the UK cannot do this and is potentially in breach of a binding 
international treaty.  
 
The Irish Government could legitimately take the matter to the United Nations and the UK 
government could be obliged to defend a reneging before the International Court of Justice, 
although that scenario is far-fetched. Alternatively, the Irish government could agree to 
renegotiate the 1998 Agreement and allow the UK to replace references to the EU with the 
EEA, or other arrangements as appropriate, but where is the incentive for the Irish 
Government to allow the dismantling of an aspect of what is widely held as a model peace 
and political deal? The Irish government is traditionally Europhile, even if the Irish electorate 
has become less so in recent times, needing a second referendum to uphold the Nice and 
Lisbon treaties. The EU component of the Agreement was hardly central to its workings, 
which are most important in respect of power-sharing within Northern Ireland, but 
international agreements cannot be cherry-picked. There may be demands that any revised 
Good Friday Agreement be put to the electorates North and South, as it was in 1998. If the 
Irish government fails to act to uphold the Agreement in its current form, it is likely that 
other political parties will act. This might be a more fruitful route for Sinn Fein than calls for 
a border poll on Irish reunification which will not be granted by the UK Secretary of State 
and would in any case be lost for the republican cause if confined to Northern Ireland.   
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Strand Three of the Good Friday Agreement has also indirectly fuelled the debate over EU 
membership. Although the Conservative government will act on the basis of the UK as an 
entirety, variable geometry of belonging is apparent. Guernsey, Jersey and the Isle of Man 
are three UK dependencies which form part of the British-Irish Council established under 
Strand Three of the 1998 deal but do not belong to the European Union. Exponents of 
flexibility4 argue that whilst England and Wales can leave the EU, separate arrangements 
can pertain to other parts of the UK, pending the resolution of UK status via a border poll 
(Northern Ireland) or independence referendum (Scotland) following the alteration of the 
terms of union precipitated by EU withdrawal.  
 
A further awkward aspect of UK withdrawal relates to the European Convention of Human 
Rights (ECHR). The Convention is not an EU institution, but secession from the EU may 
embolden those in the Conservative Party seeking to replace adherence to the ECHR with a 
UK Bill of Rights. Again, this would be at odds with the Good Friday Agreement in which the 
British government committed to ‘complete incorporation into Northern Ireland law of the 
ECHR, with direct access to the courts, and remedies for breach of the Convention’ (p. 20) 
and retreat from this pledge may be subject to legal challenge. 
 
The response of political parties to the challenges posed to the Good Friday Agreement by 
Brexit has been predictably variable. Whilst accepting the vast bulk of its content in the 
2006 St Andrews Agreement, the anti-EU DUP never supported the Good Friday Agreement 
and regards its references to the EU as irrelevant. The DUP’s government partners in Sinn 
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Fein take a diametrically opposite view in defending the Agreement. The SDLP has been the 
most pro-EU party in Northern Ireland, in the 1990s even advocating a role for the EU 
Commission in directly running the region. Its strong promotion of the Good Friday 
Agreement has been within the party’s ideological outlook of a Europe of the Regions. The 
UUP response, as co-architects of the Agreement with the SDLP, has been more mixed. The 
current leadership defend the deal and the EU, but the party leader at the time of the 
Agreement, David Trimble, now a Conservative peer, advocates Brexit. 
 
Hardening the border 
Fears of a return to a hard border between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland 
may be exaggerated. The security checkpoints of the 1970s-1990s era were a response by 
the British to the threat from an IRA operating on both sides of the border. The deployment 
of British military personnel and installations further alienated the republican section of the 
border population sympathetic to the IRA. The modern-day ‘dissident’ IRAs, although still a 
threat, are much smaller, not as active and afforded less traction by republican border 
communities. There is also no desire for the British government to revive the security focus 
of the Troubles. It would take an unforeseen upsurge in armed republican activity for this to 
change. 
 
Beyond the old conflict however, there are obvious tensions between the maintenance of 
an open border and the aspiration to control immigration. Bereft of border controls, there 
will be no obvious way of preventing large numbers of EU nationals entering the UK from 
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the EU by crossing the border between the Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland. Self-
evidently, there is the possibility of large numbers of EU nationals seeking to live and work 
in the UK entering via this route, across a border currently marked only by an occasional 
sign and a few currency huts for euro-sterling exchanges.  
 
Whilst the UK would retain the right to deport those arrivals entering illegally (by, for 
example, failing to satisfy an immigration points system which may be put in place) without 
knowledge of such arrivals, UK border agencies would find it impossible to act meaningfully 
within Northern Ireland. The UK could conceivably confine its border control frontier to 
England, Scotland and Wales as an alternative. This would potentially place Northern Ireland 
within a more overtly ‘Irish context’, a feature which would be welcomed by nationalists but 
might concern unionists. In the absence of a significant paramilitary threat (although, if 
revived, one that might target British customs posts) the Irish government will be unwilling 
to undertake border policing on behalf of the British government. 
  
The border has diminished greatly in salience in recent years, albeit not in constitutional 
terms with unionist versus nationalist differences over its long-term future still dominating 
Northern Ireland politics. The pragmatic benefits of cross-border trade and ease of 
movement have become accepted as routine. A majority of unionists now accept the North-
South bodies established under the Good Friday Agreement. By far the most significant of 
those bodies is the Special European Union Programmes Body (SEUPB), which manages 
cross-border EU structural funds. The SEUPB implements the EU Programme for Peace and 
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Reconciliation in Northern Ireland, which has amounted to four peace programmes 
financially underwriting the peace process, providing more than 1.3 billion euros of funding. 
These projects have diminished the border’s salience, vastly improved cross-border 
transport links and brought the two main communities together in seeking joint funding. 
The current Peace IV programme is due to expire in 2020, but an earlier Brexit will see the 
curtailment or abandonment of several projects. The EU’s promotion of reconciliation and 
an all-island infrastructure has not shifted identities. Only four per cent of the population 
see themselves as European, with the bulk adopting British, Irish or, to a lesser extent, 
Northern Irish identities. The perception of the EU has tended to be that of a generous cash 
cow.5 That generosity, allied to the all-island commonalities of EU citizenship, has 
ameliorated the physical border and diminished the political hostilities emanating from its 
existence, advances which may now be tested. 
 
Cross-border trade 
Cross-border trade between Northern Ireland and the Irish Republic has increased 
significantly during the last two decades of relative peace. The question begged is what 
happens to such trade in a new era likely to involve tariffs placed upon UK goods heading 
into the Irish Republic and on UK imports from across the border? Such a scenario may be 
avoided if the UK buys into a European Economic Area agreement, or a bilateral deal is 
agreed between the UK and Ireland permitting a special customs arrangement allowing 
goods and services to travel between the two states (or possibly Northern Ireland and the 
Irish Republic only) free of charge.  Either would have to be approved by all member states 
9 
 
of the EU and the chances of approval of a bespoke deal benefiting only the UK and Ireland 
and at odds with core EU principles appears remote. 
 
That an ‘a la carte’ trade arrangement would benefit Northern Ireland, the UK more widely 
and the Republic of Ireland can hardly be doubted and special treatment possesses 
historical, geographical, economic and political justifications. The economic case for the 
avoidance of tariffs is pressing upon the Republic of Ireland. Thirty-four per cent of its 
exports of goods and services go to the Eurozone, of which almost half go to Britain, the 
highest single reliance upon British purchases of any EU country.6  It is unsurprising 
therefore that the Taoiseach has been in no rush to endorse those desirous of a punitive 
response to Brexit.  
 
However, as the EU represents its largest export market, withdrawal matters even more to 
Northern Ireland than it does to the Irish Republic or the rest of the UK. Exports to EU 
countries are likely to suffer from the imposition of tariffs. Growth in such exports has 
considerably outpaced that to non-EU countries in recent years and amounted to £3.63bn in 
2014, compared to £2.53bn of non-EU exports7, whilst Northern Ireland is also more reliant 
upon imports from the EU, now likely to be more expensive, than other parts of the UK. The 
importance of Northern Ireland’s currently tariff-free trade relationship with the Irish 
Republic is apparent, with 37 per cent of the North’s EU exports heading there, amounting 
to 21 per cent of its exports. Northern Ireland’s EU trade dependence has been such that a 
three per cent reduction in the region’s GDP has been calculated as the likely outcome of 
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withdrawal.8 Whilst some local measures were already in place to boost the local economy 
regardless of the referendum outcome, notably the plan to cut corporation tax to 12.5 per 
cent in April 2018, economic effects upon Northern Ireland may be particularly severe. 
Sectoral impacts will vary, but given that the region contains the most agricultural economy 
of any part of the UK, potential impacts upon farmers are especially noteworthy. Common 
Agricultural Policy (CAP) payments provided 60 per cent of their cash income in 2014-15.9 
  Northern Ireland’s farmers receive one of the highest payments-per-hectare annual awards 
in the EU and 9 per cent of the UK’s total allocation of EU pillar payments, with these 
subsidies and presumably some farms now on borrowed time.10 
 
Conclusion 
A number of uncertainties pertain to Northern Ireland’s departure from the UK. The Good 
Friday Agreement will require alteration, the physical status of the border may change 
slightly and the improvements in cross-border trade evident in recent years may be 
reversed. Prior to Brexit, relations between the UK and the Irish government had never 
been better and the cooperative bilateralism which emerged during the peace process was 
abetted by shared EU membership. The pragmatic logic of continued cooperation may 
ensure that difficulties are surmounted and British-Irish exceptionalism, long evident in such 
matters as voting rights in the UK for Irish citizens, is likely to be seen in terms of permitting 
free movement across a soft land border between Northern Ireland and the Republic of 
Ireland. This may of course displease those in the UK desirous of much tighter controls and 
may meet opposition within the EU from those wanting sanctions against the UK. Given the 
majority opposition within Northern Ireland to withdrawal from the EU, the process of UK 
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disengagement will not represent a fulfilment of desires to ‘take back control’, the campaign 
slogan favoured by those wishing to leave the EU.  
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